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Abstract
Religious land use disputes are characterized by high levels
of conflict and the potential to seriously undermine social
capital in affected communities. Contemporary land use
procedures reflect an antiquated heritage and reliance upon
adversarial means that are inadequate to successfully resolve
these socially complex local conflicts. While there are
practical obstacles, mediation holds advantages over these
existing procedures in terms of dispute resolution, and has
greater potential to preserve and build social capital at the
local level. This article examines the theoretical justification
for mediation in this context, and argues for moving beyond
the status quo.
Introduction .............................................................................................................2
I. The Adversarial Character of Local Land Use Procedures ................................4
II. Culture Wars and the New Wave of Religious Land Use Disputes ..................11
III. Religion in the Public Square...........................................................................20
A. The Risk of Polarization in Arguments over Religion................................20
B. Religious Arguments in Public Discourse ..................................................22
C. Conflict and Community.............................................................................29
IV. Potential Obstacles and Objections to Mediation ............................................34
Conclusions and Recommendations .......................................................................38

1

The author is an Adjunct Professor at the University of California, Hastings College
of the Law, where he teaches negotiation and mediation, and an attorney and mediator in
the San Francisco Bay Area. He earned his J.D. degree from the University of San
Francisco, and an LL.M. in dispute resolution from University of Missouri-Columbia.
Thanks to John Lande, Len Riskin, Robert Ackerman, and Clare Gibson, who reviewed
earlier drafts of this article, and to the faculty and staff at the Center for the Study of
Dispute Resolution at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, for their
support.

2

MEDIATING RELIGIOUS LAND USE DISPUTES

[4/5/2006

INTRODUCTION
In the name of religious freedom, the federal government has
reversed the traditional deference accorded to local government land use
decisions. By enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”),2 Congress has shifted the balance of
power between individuals and groups who claim religious reasons for the
use of their real property and the communities in which they are embedded,
setting the course for an unprecedented clash of religious values and
community interests. Whatever one may think of the wisdom of this new
course, it raises the question of how well the traditional system of local land
use regulation is designed to resolve disputes involving religious values.
While rare in the past, religious land use disputes have become
widespread since the adoption of RLUIPA. That statute provides an
exemption from state and local government zoning or landmarking laws
where they “substantially burden” the religious exercise of individuals,
groups, or institutions, unless the law or imposition of the law is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest.3 In addition to imposing a regime of strict
judicial scrutiny of local land use decisions, RLUIPA also awards attorneys
fees to successful litigants,4 putting religious land use claims on a par with
traditional civil rights litigation. Because religious persons—if not religious
congregations—are present everywhere people reside, and because
relatively few parcels of land used or potentially used for religious purposes
remain free of zoning restrictions, the likelihood of such disputes arising is
high.
The prospect of gaining an exemption from zoning regulations,
2

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. The land use provisions of the statute apply to both
zoning and historic landmarking laws, and while I mostly refer to the former in my
analysis, the impact of RLUIPA on historic landmarking disputes is the same and my
analysis is intended to apply to those as well. As the name of the statute suggests,
however, a portion of the statute pertains to the rights of institutionalized persons, such as
prisoners. These latter provisions were recently upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court against
an Establishment Clause challenge. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005). That
decision, however, specifically reserved judgment on the constitutionality of the land use
provisions that are the focus of this article. 125 S.Ct. at 2118, fn.3.
3
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). In addition, RLUIPA contains three “categorical”
prohibitions, preempting zoning and landmarking laws which: 1) treat religious assemblies
or institutions on “less than equal terms” compared to nonreligious assemblies or
institutions; 2) discriminate on the basis of religion or religious denomination; or 3) totally
exclude or unreasonably limit religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a
jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b).
4
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
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along with the tempting prospect of attorneys fees if litigation follows,
provides religious land owners an almost irresistible incentive to assert
claims of religious discrimination if they face opposition to their use or
proposal, if only to gain strategic leverage in the land use approval process.5
Not surprisingly, a large variety and number of claims have been filed under
RLUIPA in the short time since its passage.6 And it is likely that where
such disputes arise, they will consume an inordinate amount of time,
energy, money, and social capital7 in these communities.
Land use disputes that involve claims of religious freedom touch on
some of the most contentious and difficult challenges of civic life. They
raise the complex issue of how best to reconcile the concerns and
imperatives of religiously motivated individuals or institutions with the
interests of their neighbors, and the interests of the communities in which
they exist.8 These conflicts contain a significant potential to create social
5

In this article I mostly refer to the land use approval or permitting process, in which
property owners seek the right to commence a new use on their property. However, many
religious land use disputes involve enforcement actions, where the local zoning authority is
seeking to halt or modify an existing use of the property that it alleges to be out of
conformance with applicable zoning requirements. See, e.g., Murphy v. Zoning Com'n of
Town of New Milford, 289 F.Supp.2d 87 (D. Conn. 2003), vacated as unripe, 42 F.3d 342
(2nd Cir. 2005) (challenging Town’s cease and desist order issued to halt Sunday prayer
meetings held in home in single family residential neighborhood). My analysis extends
equally to both contexts, but for convenience I will mostly refer to the former.
6
Advocates as well as scholars have attempted to track litigation filed under RLUIPA
since its enactment. One public interest law firm involved in bringing RLUIPA keeps a
running list of such cases on its web site. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, at
http://www.rluipa.com/cases/court_cases.html (last checked March 27, 2006). While the
courts could eventually strike down or all or parts of RLUIPA, the analysis set forth here
will remain pertinent to the smaller universe of constitutional—as opposed to statutory—
claims of religious discrimination in land use disputes.
7
Professor Ackerman defines social capital as “the connections between individuals
that build social networks.” See Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict
Resolution and the Search for Community, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 27, 28 (2002)
(citing ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 19 (2000)).
8
Richard Schragger has captured well the opposing views:
To Congress and the law's supporters, RLUIPA is necessary to prevent
local governments from discriminating against particular religions (or
religion in general) by limiting religious congregations' ability to build or
expand places of worship. The charge is that localities enforce religious
bigotry through the strategic use of often vague and standardless land-use
ordinances and development processes. To its critics, RLUIPA is a
dramatic interference with local power to enforce generally applicable
zoning rules and an unnecessarily broad exemption that allows religious
organizations (and no others) to flout a community's reasonable land-use
concerns.
Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of
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divisions lasting long after a particular dispute has settled.9
The question addressed in this article is whether existing systems for
processing religious land use claims are well suited to the task. The
conclusion is that they are not, and that local officials and others involved in
religious land use disputes ought to consider employing mediation at an
early stage. The main virtue of mediation in this context is the opportunity
it provides for disputants to meet face-to-face in an effort to understand—
even if they do not agree with—the views of others. A facilitated meeting
of persons with differing perspectives is precisely what is missing from the
traditional systems of land use decision making, which, like the litigation
process, is adversarial in nature and designed to keep separate rather than
bring together those who disagree. Significant by-products of using
mediation are the potential for increasing social capital in the community,
and developing additional capacity within the community for problemsolving and healthy dispute resolution practices. These outcomes are likely
to produce stronger and more vibrant communities.
Part I of this article examines the existing system for resolving land
use disputes, why it is generally ill suited to the task of effectively resolving
religious land use disputes. Part II describes the contentious cultural
climate around issues of religion in our country, and how, as a product of
that larger debate, RLUIPA has the potential to bring divisive religious
disputes to every community in America. Part III looks more closely at the
debate in the scholarly literature about the place of religion in public
discourse, speculates concerning the challenges these issues present to local
efforts to resolve religious land use disputes, and argues that mediation
provides a good model to promote useful public dialogue in the midst of
such disputes. Finally, part IV discusses concerns about and challenges to
using mediation in these situations.
I. THE ADVERSARIAL CHARACTER OF LOCAL LAND USE PROCEDURES
Parcels of real property are unique and highly local by definition,
and local zoning regulations tend to reflect this and exhibit a tremendous
variability from one jurisdiction to the next.10 The idiosyncratic nature of
Religious Liberty, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1810, 1839 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
9
Cf. Ackerman, supra note 7, at 59 (“communities that have been the focus of …
adjudicated zoning battles often require years to mend their wounds.”).
10
This lack of uniformity is troubling for many, especially in the developer
community, and there have been periodic calls for the development and adoption of more
uniform laws and regulations. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan & Carrie Richter, Out of the
Chaos: Towards a National System of Land-Use Procedures, 34 Urb. Law. 449 (2002)
(recommending reform of “the current Balkanized systems of planning”); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Model Legislation for Land Use Decisions, 35 Urb. Law. 635 (2003)
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local regulations creates tension with any jurisprudential or regulatory effort
to exert a centralizing or unifying influence on, or supervision over, land
use decision making. In the effort to assure accountability for local land use
decisions while at the same time respecting democratic principles, judicial
decisions and state-wide planning legislation have created a system of land
use disputing that draws its inspiration from the adversarial and
adjudicatory model of the courtroom.
As the size and complexity of the nation grew during the twentieth
century, local officials increasingly saw the need for systematic community
land planning and regulation.11 There also arose a recognition—at least in
urban areas and among urban planners—that communities face uniquely
local challenges and opportunities relating to growth, and therefore some
measure of discretion ought to be left to local officials to negotiate, in the
context of specific land use proposals or issues, for the optimal distribution
of benefits and burdens from development.12 That discretion, however,
creates a fundamental concern from the perspective of law and democratic
governance, concern both as to the proper amount of discretion and the need
to police concerns about civil rights, property rights, accountability, fairness
and due process.
In response, both the courts and state legislatures have imposed
upon local zoning officials a “quasi-judicial” model of decision-making
aimed at: 1) curbing abuses of discretion when local authorities adjudge
development proposals; and 2) facilitating subsequent judicial review.13
(reviewing the American Planning Association’s model code for zoning procedures).
11
Sullivan & Richter, supra note 10, at 451-54. See also, Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking,
and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7
Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 337, 340-44 (2002) (reviewing history of land use planning in the
United States).
12
See Ryan, supra note 11, at 349 (arguing that land use decision-making has grown
increasingly discretionary and “has shifted from the planned to the particularized, affording
a more ad hoc response to individual development proposals.”).
13
See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as Problems
of Local Legitimacy, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 837, 850, 867 (1983). In this article, Professor Rose
describes how the adjudicative model and the concomitant prescription of courtroom-like
procedures arose from parallel developments in the field of administrative law. Id. at 84453. From this premise, she argues that fundamental differences distinguishing large
governmental bureaucracies from local governments—such as the idea that an
administrative agency would possess a certain focus and expertise—were overlooked, and
the resulting jurisprudence of local land use decisions tends to misconstrue the nature and
benefits of local decision-making. She concludes that local land use decisions are best
understood as efforts to mediate between private and public interests in the use of real
property. Even in the administrative law context, however, many see the need for more
collaborative forms of decision-making.
See, e.g. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982) (explaining arguments for the
explicit recognition of private interests and the incorporation of direct negotiations with
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Thus, formal public hearings may involve published and mailed notices,
issuance of subpoenas, the administration of oaths, the right to present
testimony and cross-examine witnesses, submission of written evidence and
arguments, a record of the hearing, issuance of a formal written decision,
and the right to an administrative appeal.14 Typically, not all of these
elements are present, and often they are not evident to the public. On the
whole, public hearings in land use matters retain a structured formality
calculated to keep opponents separated, talking only to the decision makers
and not to each other.
To capture a sense of how this process embodies explicit and
implicit adversarial values and assumptions, it is useful to describe in detail
what transpires in a typical public hearing.15 Just as in a courtroom, the
participants and members of the public attending a zoning hearing sit facing
forward towards the individual or panel that is charged with deciding the
matter. They are expected to remain largely silent unless making a formal
presentation up at the podium designated for speakers. The podium is
usually situated at the head of the public seating area, and the speaker has
his or her back to the audience while addressing the decision makers. After
the agency’s planning staff provides a staff report, the proponent of the
application is invited to give a presentation concerning the details of the
proposal. Aside from word of mouth, this is often the first glimpse of the
project for those in the audience, and for many it may be their first
experience with the formal zoning process.16
After these initial presentations and any follow up questions from
the decision makers, people in the audience are invited to address issues
concerning the project under consideration. If it appears that more than a
few persons intend to speak, a strict time limit of 3-5 minutes is usually
employed to keep things moving.17 Occasionally there will be a follow up
interested parties into the administrative agency rulemaking process in the case of difficult
and contested proposals).
14
See Sullivan & Richter, supra note 10, at 474.
15
There is, of course, much variety in public hearings with respect to the physical
layout of the hearing room as well as the form and formality of the proceedings. The
following sketch is intended to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive, in its description.
16
Persons more familiar with the zoning process may know that plans and other
application materials can be viewed at the planning department at certain times of the day,
and that they can ask for the assistance of a planning department employee to answer
questions about the project. But even for these persons, work or other obligations may
prevent them from doing so. For the very few people who are savvy, concerned, and have
the time to do so, a written letter sent well in advance of the hearing is often the most
effective way to voice their concerns, as is direct contact with agency staff involved with
the processing of the application, when that option is available.
17
Public hearings of local zoning boards or city councils are typically held on weekday
evenings, and the agenda will often include many other items of business including other
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question from a member of the decision making body, but for the most part
they will, at best, sit listening impassively.18 Thereafter ensues a period of
discussion solely among the decision makers, which is often just a series of
statements for public consumption intended to justify the vote the member
expects to cast when all the speeches are over. The last formality will be
the vote, after which the decision making body quickly moves on to the
next matter on its agenda or goes home.
This more or less tightly choreographed bit of public theater is
frequently the only time that proponents and opponents of the project are
together in the same room. There are no opportunities, much less
invitations, to engage in a dialogue to explore the mutual interests and
concerns of those in attendance. Everything said and done is in the nature
of performance and advocacy, calculated to cajole and persuade. And if
the stakes are high, it is likely to devolve into little more that a lengthy
shouting match, complete with cheers and jeers from the audience.
In the end, responsibility for the decision is left to the elected or
appointed decision makers. In general, these decision makers are not
planning or technical experts able to easily sift through the competing
arguments and seize upon the logically and legally relevant morsels.
Rather, this is a group of mostly well-intended community volunteers who,
with the help of their underpaid and overworked staff, have the difficult job
of weighing arguments and discerning the correct legal standards for
application to the issues for decision.19
In sum, there is very little about the public hearing process that is
designed, intended, or well suited to promote the sort of thoughtful dialogue
and deliberation that commentators have argued is necessary to successfully
public hearings. These meetings can run late into the evening, and the participants often
feel pressed for time.
18
For anybody expecting that decision makers will be held rapt by a speaker’s
eloquence, the recent case of Lacy Street Hospitality Service, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles,125 Cal.App.4th 526, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 (2004), offers an admittedly extreme, but
nonetheless cautionary, tale. In that case, the court held that an applicant seeking
modification of zoning restrictions applicable to its adult cabaret business was denied the
right to due process when the City Council failed to pay attention during the applicant’s
presentation. 125 Cal.App.4th 530-31. The offending behavior of the City Council
members, captured on videotape, included talking on their cell phones, eating, talking with
aides, reading, and one “especially peripatetic” member who walked back and forth from
one side of the council chambers to the other consulting with various colleagues. Id. at
529-30. The court noted that the council members also failed to pay attention during the
testimony of opponents to the application. Id.
19
Professor Rose argues that the only type of expertise these local officials are likely
to have is political expertise, which creates tensions with the assumptions about
impartiality that are central to the adjudicative model of decision making. Rose, supra note
13, at 869.
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navigate the difficult terrain of religion in public discourse.20 Particularly
for members of the public, the press of time and lack of access to both
information and to decision makers leaves them frustrated and with little
choice but to fire away using their strongest claims and objections.21
The process of land use decision-making reaches its denouement,
then, in a public hearing resembling a dramatic courtroom battle, with
advocates making impassioned pleas to a third party decision maker. 22 But
for some commentators—admittedly a step removed from the battlefield—
what feels like a trial to its participants can be more usefully understood as
the final session of a protracted bargaining process. In fact, taken as a
whole, the land use decision-making process resembles to them nothing so
much as mediation.23 That theoretical lens lends support to the prescriptive
thesis of the present argument, which is that actually using mediation offers
a promising alternative for the resolution of religious land use disputes.
More than twenty years ago, at the dawn of the modern alternative
dispute resolution era, Carol Rose argued that courts would do well to view
the land use process as a form of mediation between the private and public
20

See infra text accompanying notes 26-31.
Cf. Jayne E. Daly, What’s Really Needed to Effectuate Resource Protection in
Communities, 20 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 189, 205 (2002) (“At a public hearing, residents are
invited to comment on pending decisions, however, their ‘input’ is often too late to be
meaningfully incorporated. Additionally, the public’s reaction to the proposal is often
presented in an exaggerated fashion because of fear that local officials will not take their
concerns seriously.”) The commentator, a practitioner on the front lines of community
disputes, argues that citizens’ experiences with the public hearing process may explain
survey data finding a relative distrust of city and county government zoning decisions. Id.
22
A recent press report, while not involving RLUIPA, well illustrates the dynamics at
play in public hearings involving religious issues. According to the San Diego UnionTribune, 350 people—“most of them Christians”—showed up at a San Diego City Council
hearing on whether to remove a large cross from the top of Mt. Soledad. The 29-foot tall
cross has stood on a 5-foot base on city-owned property at the top of the mountain
overlooking the city since 1954. It has been the target of legal actions by (persons
identified in the article as) “atheists” since 1989. After 16 years of litigation, including a
decision by the 9th Circuit in 2002, the city had no recourse left against an injunction
requiring it to take down the cross. At what was described as an “emotional hearing,” one
person opposed to removal was quoted as telling the council: “We will either prevail
before this City Council to maintain the cross in its current location, or we will prevail in
the 2006 and 2008 elections. It is not the jurisdiction of this City Council to negotiate
away our religious freedoms. The Mount Soledad cross is non-negotiable.” See Matthew
T. Hall, No Clemency for Cross, S.D. Union-Trib., March 9, 2005, at A1, available at 2005
WL 3785333.
23
See Rose, supra note 13, at 889 (arguing that “piecemeal” zoning decisions—the
small, ad hoc determinations concerning individual parcels or properties, a category that
encompasses the bulk of religious land use disputes—“are far more realistically perceived
as mediative than quasi-judicial.”). See also Ryan, supra note 11, at 357 (stating that a
“mediation model is more realistic and less distorting”).
21
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interests in land, rather than as an adjudication of property rights.24 Her aim
was primarily theoretical and jurisprudential, but Professor Rose
acknowledged the possibility of employing mediation in this context.
“Anthropological literature, and, increasingly, modern legal literature,” she
wrote, “suggest negotiation and particularly mediation as an alternative
dispute-resolving model especially appropriate at the local or sub-local
level.”25
Rose points to the mixed public and private interests which cohabitate in any given parcel of land, and argues that local government—
through its land use regulations and procedures—mostly acts in a mediative
role, looking to find the best accommodation of these oft-competing
interests.26 Individuals serving on local elected and appointed zoning
bodies, she argues, are not trained to dispassionately apply abstract rules of
decision to competing property rights-based claims in a predictably
disciplined process, and these bodies thus are not otherwise particularly
competent to act as neutral judicial-like councils.27
Yet courts insist that local governments act more judicially when
making decisions about individual land uses proposals, and this creates
unintended consequences along with predictable efforts to evade these
restraints. Local officials have shown an “irrepressible inventiveness” in
finding ways to preserve or increase their discretion in land use decisionmaking.28 In this way, local governments have retained a significant ability
to bargain ad hoc when presented with a land use proposal. Often that
negotiation happens behind the scenes and is not readily apparent to local
residents. It takes place in the form of various one-on-one contacts and
other meetings between applicants and the local government’s professional
and technical staff, local officials, motivated citizens, and perhaps staff
from other government agencies. Most such negotiating is a response to
differing views about the requirements of applicable local, state, and federal
24

Rose, supra note 13.
Id. at 888-89. While Professor Rose’s analysis has not yet found a home in modern
land use jurisprudence, one recent commentator has argued that subsequent advances in
scholarship and theorizing of dispute resolution have only strengthened the appeal of her
arguments. See Ryan, supra note 11, at 357-59 (calling Rose’s work “the most convincing
theoretical analysis of the necessary role of bargaining in local land use decision-making”).
26
Rose, supra note 13, at 887-88 (stating that development proposals “pit the
proponent of change against the interests of neighborhood property owners or some larger
segment of the community”).
27
See supra note 19, and accompanying text. Rose argues that the insistence on
judicializing land use “at once asks too much and too little” of local governments: too
much in supposing that they can plan their futures well enough to develop fair and useful
guidelines for adjudicating future land use proposals; and too little in accepting that they
will apply these speculative and vague guides in a fair and impartial manner. Id. at 881.
28
Id. at 879-80.
25
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regulations, or in connection with the environmental review process, if any.
By the time the proposal reaches its last act in the public hearing, most if
not all such negotiations are complete or abandoned, and a more or less
final package is presented to the decision making body for a yes or no vote.
This opaque quality of the land use process poses a difficult
challenge for efforts to promote a healthy civic discourse around religious
land use disputes. Many citizens directly impacted by and most passionate
about a dispute will feel shut out of the decision making, and may
conclude—not without some justification—that the result was pre-ordained.
Their only opportunity to express support, opposition, or any other concerns
or feelings may be a two or three minute presentation, during an emotional
hearing and before a packed audience, where some will be too intimidated
to make any public statement.29
Similar to a formal judicial proceeding, participants in such a public
hearing must address their arguments to a purportedly disinterested and
neutral third party, and are not encouraged to speak to one another. The
proceedings have a formal quality, and speakers are told to raise and discuss
only a narrow range of legally and factually relevant arguments. After the
vote on the matter, some will walk away feeling vindicated while others
will feel they have lost or been victimized.
Contrast this public hearing scenario with that of a mediation
involving the same religious land use dispute. The key discussions and
negotiations would directly involve all interested parties, though
representative spokespersons would likely be selected to organize and make
more efficient the actual bargaining aspects of the mediation. With the
assistance of a skilled mediator or facilitator, participants would be invited
to express their concerns in a structured but collegial and more informal
environment. The local zoning authority would be represented and
participate as an interested party, but also with the understanding that it
retains formal responsibility to review and approve any proposal that is
reached as a result of the mediation. Much time and effort would be spent
to ensure that participants understand—even if they do not agree with—the
views and concerns of others. Also, the scope of issues and concerns
addressed in the mediation would not be strictly limited to those considered
relevant by the state legislature or the courts. Rather, the idiosyncratic
issues of the dispute and the needs of the individuals and community

29

In addition to the pressures of time and emotions, many people also suffer from a
fear of public speaking that will discourage them from voicing their thoughts and concerns.
Choosing not to speak may deprive them of the cathartic benefit which often accompanies
self-expression, and may deprive others of the benefit of that person’s viewpoint, including
information that might influence the decision making process.
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involved could addressed, in addition to the more abstract and technical
concerns found in local zoning regulations.
This type of mediation allows the community to work out a difficult
issue in a neighborly fashion. Passionate feelings can be expressed, but
there is ample opportunity—and, with the assistance of the mediator, the
skills and techniques necessary—to foster the sort of discussion and
understanding necessary to bridge the divide among participants.
Consensus solutions can be explored absent the imminent threat of a
decision being imposed by a third party. If consensus is reached, the
participants walk away with the knowledge that they arrived at their own
decision in a principled and fair fashion. The resulting consensus sends a
strong message to the ultimate decision-making body about what the
community feels is an appropriate resolution and an appropriate distribution
of benefits and burdens resulting from the decision.30
In contrast to the adjudicatory approach to resolving religious land
use disputes, mediation is more likely to foster a climate of fully-engaged
and respectful deliberation among the parties most affected by the use in
question, and to create or increase tolerance and understanding among
members of the community with differing religious concerns and
commitments. Additionally, effective citizen participation in dispute
resolution mechanisms at the community level may enhance a community’s
capacity for disputing productively and spur increased levels of social
capital, both of which encourage a more robust civic life and wellfunctioning democracy.31
The divisive nature of religious conflict is both the impetus for the
argument that religious land use disputes are ideal candidates for mediation,
and the primary challenge facing those who undertake such an effort. For
this reason, it is worth looking more closely at the larger social and cultural
forces that led to the enactment of RLUIPA, and how they manifest at the
local level in the form of religious land use disputes. This issue is examined
next.
II. CULTURE WARS AND THE NEW WAVE OF RELIGIOUS LAND USE DISPUTES

30

See, e.g., Gus Bauman, Land Use Mediation: Negotiation with Municipalities to
Get Project Approval without Litigation, SF08 ALI-ABA 519, 525 (2000) (“a mediated
plan is not likely to be rejected by the locality or taken to court by neighbors). Mediation
should not wholly supplant the public hearing and formal decision making processes of the
local zoning authority. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. But local governments,
while retaining formal authority to approve or deny a project, will have a strong incentive
to adopt the consensus solution reached in a mediation in which it participated, if only
because the other parties will hold that expectation.
31
See infra Part III.C.
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The interplay of religion and public policy is the subject of n
vigorous debate in contemporary American society.32 There is the litany of
causes—prayer in public schools, abortion, display of religious symbols on
government property, gay marriage, and others—that seem to continually
test our capacity for reasoned deliberation and tolerance for diversity.33
After the last presidential election, the airwaves, newspapers, and
the Internet were saturated with stories about religion and its influence on
electoral (and judicial) politics.34 In the year-end holiday season that
followed, the usual battles over placement of religious symbols on public
property were subsumed in a broader debate about putting “more Christ into
Christmas.”35 It seems these days that every public issue with religious
32

See, e.g., Robert Justin Lipkin, Reconstructing the Public Square, 24 Cardozo L.
Rev. 2025, 2026 n.6 (2003) (“controversies over the appropriate limits of Church and State
have gained a ferocious intensity over the past quarter of a century”); Alberto B. Lopez,
Equal Access and the Public Forum: Pinette’s Imbalance of Free Speech and
Establishment, 55 Baylor L. Rev. 167, 169, 169 n.5 (2003) (collecting recent newspaper
articles and asserting that concern about separation of church and state “permeates public
discourse”). Issues of church and state are also contested abroad, though perhaps with less
acrimony. See, e.g., Ian Fisher, Letter from Europe; Italy’s Church and State: A Mostly
Happy Union, N.Y. Times, December 1, 2004, at A4, available at 2004 WLNR 12606835
(describing the effects of the established church on the social and political life of Italy, and
exploring similar themes in other western European nations).
33
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious
Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 1047,
1070-73 (1996) (arguing that political changes in the 1960’s lead to political organizing
and activism among evangelical Christian groups, resulting in “bitter national debates”
with liberal and Jewish interest groups).
34
See, e.g., Frank Rich, 2004: The Year of ‘The Passion,’ N.Y. Times, December 19,
2004, Section 2, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 14330194 (reporting that immediately after
the election NBC’s “Meet the Press” and ABC’s “This Week” Sunday talk shows featured
religious leaders discussing religious values and electoral outcomes).
35
The Associated Press recently reported on a nationwide effort to highlight the
Christian meaning of Christmas, providing notable examples of activism including an
effort to boycott major department stores that have replaced “Merry Christmas” with
“Happy Holidays” signs in their windows, and reporting that one organization, the Alliance
Defense Fund, has a list of 800 lawyers “waiting in the wings” to litigate these matters.
Allen G. Breed (Associated Press), Christian Conservatives Say it’s 'Christmas’ time;
Their Election-induced Push Against “Holiday” and “Season” Greetings Draws Support,
Concern, Philadelphia Inquirer, December 15, 2004, at A3, available at 2004 WL
103345658 (“Emboldened by their Election Day successes, some Christian conservatives
around the country are trying to put more Christ into Christmas”). Id. There were the usual
assortment of disputes over religious symbols, as well. See, e.g., Alan Cooperman,
Evangelicals Use Courts to Fight Restrictions on Christmas Tidings, Washington Post,
December 20, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WL 101231741 (reporting several disputes
over Christmas trees on public property, the singing of carols in schools, inclusion of
mangers in public school plays, and the like); Julie E. Bisbee (Associated Press), Pulled
Nativity Irks Voters in Oklahoma, Orlando Sentinel, December 19, 2004, at A3 (reporting
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implications is hotly contested.36
While the political rhetoric heated up in Washington, D.C.,37 most
actual disputes involving religion are and continue to be played out at the
local level, in communities and schools.38 Not surprisingly, religious land
use disputes are highly localized.39 Thus, when Congress enacted RLUIPA
that voters in Mustang, Oklahoma, defeated two school bond measures in retaliation for the
decision of the school administration to remove a nativity scene from a school Christmas
Program).
36
Former Reagan appointee Clint Eastwood, interviewed about accusations aired on
political talk shows that his Oscar-winning film, Million Dollar Baby, was intended to
promote euthanasia, expressed frustration at the current cultural and political climate:
‘I never thought about the political side of this when making the
film,’ Mr. Eastwood says. He is both bemused and concerned that a
movie with no political agenda should be construed by some as a polemic
and arouse such partisan rage. ‘Maybe I'm getting to the age when I'm
starting to be senile or nostalgic or both, but people are so angry now,’ he
adds. ‘You used to be able to disagree with people and still be friends.
Now you hear these talk shows, and everyone who believes differently
from you is a moron and an idiot - both on the right and the left.’
Frank Rich, How Dirty Harry Turned Commie, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2005, Section 2,
at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 2040605.
37
See, e.g, Will Lester (Associated Press), Right Wing Set to Press Agenda; Supreme
Court Vacancies Would Get Top Priority, The Columbian, January 2, 2005, at A10,
available at 2005 WLNR 94687 (reporting that in the aftermath of President Bush’s
reelection, “[s]ocial conservatives want to push for a federal ban on gay marriage, new
restrictions on abortion and rollbacks of laws limiting a church’s participation in politics”);
David D. Kirkpatrick, Evangelical Leader Threatens to Use His Political Muscle Against
Some Democrats, N.Y. Times, January 1, 2005, at A10, available at 2005 WLNR 22492
(reporting that “James C. Dobson, the nations most influential evangelical leader, is
threatening to put six potentially vulnerable Democratic senators ‘in the bull’s-eye’ if they
block conservative appointments to the Supreme Court.”).
38
See, e.g, Sara B. Miller, In Schools and Cities, Battles over ‘Christ’ in Christmas,
Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 58698416
(noting that “years of lawsuits [have] caused schools and local governments to pull back
from” traditional forms of celebration of Christmas); cf., Schragger, supra note 8, at 1811
(“Much of the Supreme Court’s modern Religion Clause doctrine has been forged in
conflicts that directly implicate the traditional powers of local governments: primary and
secondary education, land use, police powers”).
39
The courts have long recognized that land use regulation is a “quintessentially” local
matter. See Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Com’n, 402 F.3d 342, 348-49 (2nd Cir. 2005)
(stating that “land use disputes are uniquely matters of local concern more aptly suited for
local resolution,” and citing similar decisions from other circuit courts of appeal); see also,
Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 Ind. L. J. 311, 353 (2002) (hereinafter,
Hamilton, Federalism). As Professor Hamilton, a prominent critic of RLUIPA, explains:
Land use law has always been a creature of state and local law. The
reason for this is three-fold. First, the permanent nature of land—its
immovability—makes its uses far more relevant to those who are nearby
than those who are far away. Second, how land is used is an essential
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it took an unprecedented step into local waters,40 and the result has been a
wave of religious land use disputes in communities nationwide.41 To better
understand the consequences of what Congress has done, it is helpful to
briefly review the emergence of RLUIPA from the broader battles involving
the Free Exercise Clause in the courts and in Congress.42
The events leading to the enactment of RLUIPA demonstrate that
this national debate over religion has now filtered down to local
communities in the form of religious land use disputes. Between 1960 and
1990, beginning with the decisions in Sherbert v. Verner,43 and then
Wisconsin v. Yoder,44 the Supreme Court began to back away from a bright
line distinction between religiously motivated actions and religious beliefs,
and on occasion invoked a balancing test requiring the government to
justify a substantial burden imposed on a person’s religious practice.45
Then, in 1990, a divided court in Employment Division v. Smith declared
“an individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate,”
igniting a debate concerning the history and meaning of the Free Exercise

ingredient for communities to develop their character and to pursue
shared purposes. Land use law is one of the key ways that communities
come together to set priorities, to establish their character, and to meet
fiscal, aesthetic, and lifestyle needs. Third, by keeping land use law local,
citizens have more direct access to their representative (than if those
representatives were national) and a proportionally larger voice in the
land use process that directly affects them. Land use law is enacted by
the state and local governing bodies and implemented by locally elected
or appointed boards, with publicized public hearings an integral
component in altering the law and in applying it.
Id. at 335 (footnotes omitted).
40
See Schragger, supra note 8, at 1839 (“RLUIPA is, in essence, the first national
land-use ordinance.”).
41
Id. at 1839 n.121 (compiling RLUIPA decisions). See, also, Allison B. Cohen,
Neighbors Divided; A Religious Land-use Law Designed to Protect Institutions Fuels Some
Zoning Disputes, L.A. Times, April 25, 2004, at K1, available at 2004 WL 55908541
(estimating there were 50 active RLIUPA cases nationwide).
42
For a comprehensive look at this history, see Hamilton, Federalism, supra note 39.
43
374 U.S. 393, 403 (1963).
44
406 U.S. 205, 220 (1971).
45
The distinction between actions and beliefs was set out in the Supreme Court’s first
Free Exercise case, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), affirming the bigamy
conviction of a Mormon.
See, generally, ROTUNDA & NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 21.7-21.8 (3d. ed. 1999); Alan C. Weinstein, Land Use
Regulation of Religious Institutions: Balancing Planning Concerns with Constitutional
and Statutory Safeguards for Religious Freedom, in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 150-51 (Daniel R. Mandelker
& Rebecca L. Rubin, Eds., 2001).
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Clause.46
Fearing that important constitutional guarantees had been
undermined, religious groups intensively lobbied Congress to step in and
restore what they felt had been lost.47 Their efforts bore fruit initially with
the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”),
which was explicitly aimed at overturning the result in Smith by
incorporating the strict scrutiny standard from Sherbert.48 However, RFRA
was quickly invalidated in City of Boerne v. Flores, when the Court held
that Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.49
After the Boerne decision, the Religious Liberty Protection
Act of 1998, followed by the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999,
were introduced into Congress. Both bills were substantially similar to
RFRA, in that they applied broadly to state and federal regulations and
actions of every kind, although this time Congress was mindful to claim
authority under its Spending and Commerce powers, in addition to the
enforcement power under Section 5. In the latter of these two bills,
Congress for the first time inserted language specifically relating to land use
regulation. It justified these new provisions by declaring that land use
regulation “lacks objective, generally applicable standards, and instead
relies on discretionary, individualized determinations,” and stated that
Congress was responding to “the established evidence of discriminatory
land use regulations based on Congress’ remedial power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to the Court’s directive in Boerne.”50
46

494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). In Smith, the Court held that a criminal law banning the
use of peyote was valid even though it was applied to deny unemployment benefits to
members of the Native American Church who used peyote for sacramental purposes and
were dismissed from their jobs in a private drug counseling program for using an illegal
drug. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that the right of free exercise of
religion does not relieve individuals of the obligation to comply with valid, religiously
neutral laws of general application. Much criticism has focused on the Supreme Court
itself. See, e.g., Andrew A. Beerworth, Religion in the Marketplace: Establishments,
Pluralisms, and the Doctrinal Eclipse of Free Exercise, 26 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 333, 333338 (2004) (arguing that the Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence is plagued by
“inconsistencies [which] have prompted serious concerns about the Court's competency in
resolving church-state problems”).
47
See Schragger, supra note 8, at 1835-36.
48
Id. RFRA is found at 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(b) (1993), and provides as follows:
“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of further that
compelling governmental interest.”
49
521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the application of RFRA to a local
historic landmark dispute involving property owned by the Catholic Church).
50
H.R. NO. 106-219, at 17 (1999). Critics have disagreed with these conclusions,
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Significant opposition arose to these bills, however, and neither passed.51
After these legislative efforts failed, a few members of the sponsoring
coalition persevered, introducing a compromise bill retaining only the land
use elements plus a provision regarding “institutionalized persons.” That
bill, RLUIPA, passed Congress and was signed into law by President
Clinton, effective September 22, 2000.52
RLUIPA places the religious discrimination claims of owners or
users of real property on par with traditional civil rights litigation. It creates
an exemption for religious land users to all state and local government
zoning or landmarking laws when such laws substantially burden religious
exercise, unless the law furthers a compelling governmental interest and is
the least restrictive means of doing so.53 RLUIPA reverses the longestablished presumption of validity and respect traditionally accorded the
decisions of local planning and zoning officials, and, together with the
threat of large attorneys fees awards, has created an atmosphere where
many counties, cities, and towns accede to the demands of potential
plaintiffs who can assert religious reasons for the use or proposed use of
their property. In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has
pursued RLUIPA enforcement actions against local jurisdictions in
conjunction with suits by religious congregations, putting additional
pressure on these communities to settle rather than pursue legal claims.54
Because RLUIPA potentially applies to any person or organization
that uses real property for a religious purpose, the statute creates a large
spectrum of possible objections to zoning regulations. Each dispute will be
unique, involving a different parcel of property, different religious acts and
purposes, different sets of zoning regulations, different communities, not to
mention different personalities. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some
typical, recurring themes thus far in religious land use disputes:
Locating in commercial and industrial areas.

Churches55 will

arguing that Congress made no effort to investigate and understand the nature of land use
regulation, and that it failed to establish (as required by the Boerne decision) a pattern of
widespread religious discrimination in land use regulations or activities. See, e.g.,
Hamilton, Federalism, supra note 39, at 335-52.
51
Hamilton, Federalism, supra note 39, at 335-52.
52
Id. at 334.
53
42 U.S.C. sec. 2000cc(a)(1). RLUIPA also imposes certain related categorical
prohibitions in the regulation of religious exercise. See supra note 3.
54
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justice Dept. Takes Up a Little Church’s Zoning Fight, N.Y.
Times, July 4, 2003, at A14, available at 2003 WLNR 5170419 (reporting that DOJ had
initiated enforcement proceedings in conjunction with a RLUIPA action brought by a
religious congregation against the County of Maui, Hawaii).
55
The use, in this article, of the term “church” may refer either to the community of
religious practitioners or the physical structures associated with their use of a site, or both,
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often attempt to locate in depressed commercial areas or even
shopping centers where land values and rents are low. Local
governments and local merchants, who argue that having major
noncommercial uses in commercial areas will thwart efforts to
reinvigorate and grow the commercial district and the local
economy, sometimes oppose these efforts.56
Expansion in residential zones. Existing churches in residential
zones are often small, but may wish to expand the scope and
intensity of their activities, or expand their physical facilities to
accommodate growth in membership.57 The historic model of
small community-oriented churches has become outdated in
recent years; many churches are quite entrepreneurial (for
example, renting facilities for receptions and other social
gatherings), and have a full calendar of events throughout the
week. Many have active and varied ministries involving
religious education and daycare, feeding and housing the
homeless, substance abuse rehabilitation, counseling, or shelters
for abused persons. Yet many communities have not updated
their planning regulations in response to these societal changes,
and others find themselves constrained because they are older,
“built-out” communities, limited in their ability to change
historic development patterns.
Use of Single Family Residences. A recurring dispute under
RLUIPA involves religious groups or individuals seeking to use
single-family homes in single-family neighborhoods for their
religious activities. Neighbors of such uses often are concerned
about the loss of residential character that can accompany the
conversion from residential to religious use.58
Religious Schools. Another common situation has been the
siting or expansion of schools associated with religious
and should be understood to include similar institutions such as temples and mosques.
56
See, e.g., Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F.Supp.2d 1083
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (congregation sought to locate to a commercial district).
57
See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F.Supp.2d 1186
(D. Wyo. 2002) (church in a low-density residential area sought permit to operate an onsite day-care facility).
58
See, e.g., Murphy v. Zoning Com’n of Town of New Milford, 289 F.Supp.2d 87 (D.
Conn. 2003) vacated as unripe, 402 F.3d 342 (2nd Cir. 2005). In Murphy, a couple living
at the end of a cul-de-sac hosted regular prayer meetings involving as many as 50-60
guests. The town issued an order limiting the number of attendees to 25, the homeowner
sued, and the court granted an injunction against the town, finding that the town’s actions
violated RLUIPA. The injunction was subsequently vacated on appeal to the Second
Circuit, on ripeness grounds.
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organizations.59 Whether small or quite large, as some are,
religious schools feature all the same impacts as other schools,
including traffic, large events, noise, morning and evening
hours, and they frequently draw objections from neighboring
residential uses.
As the above examples suggest, religious land use disputes usually
involve individuals or groups who are part of a larger community, but are at
cross-purposes with some in that community. To give a better sense of how
mediation might work in such situations, consider a hypothetical example of
the first type of dispute described above, where a long-established
congregation in a residential neighborhood seeks to remodel, modernize,
and expand its facilities. The congregation submits an application to
remodel its sanctuary and expand the seating area for religious services, to
build a new multi-purpose room for meetings and receptions or other events
involving up to five hundred people, to construct two additional classrooms
for the existing preschool, and to provide fifty additional parking spaces.
The plan also calls for new lighting and additional landscaping. In addition,
the operational plan proposes to expand the hours of operation until 10 p.m.
on weekdays and midnight on Fridays and Saturdays, an increase in the
frequency of the congregation’s religious services, as well as an increase in
the use of facilities by outside organizations. The proposal also includes a
plan to increase preschool enrollment by one-third.
The application comes before the city’s planning commission for an
initial public hearing to consider the potential environmental impacts of the
project. Project opponents include a group of nearby residents who have
just created an informal neighborhood association to represent their views
and concerns to city officials. The hearing draws a standing room only
crowd, roughly split between opponents and supporters, the latter including
many congregation members. From the testimony, it is clear that the
project has been carefully conceived and is very important to its supporters.
They believe it is urgently needed to ensure the future well being of the
congregation and their ability to pursue their religious mission. It is
likewise clear that the nearby residents have legitimate concerns about the
impact the project will have on their lives.
The congregation believes that without improvements to its decadesold facilities, strained as well by the gradual growth in the size and
activities of its membership, they will be unable to meet the needs and
expectations of their members for a vital and relevant ministry. The
59

See, e.g., Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 386 F. 3d 183 (2nd
Cir. 2004) (Orthodox Jewish day school with enrollment of 470 sought to construct 25
additional classrooms and a multi-purpose room on existing site).
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neighbors, on the other hand, already have concerns about the amount of
traffic and the number of activities occurring in what they see as an
otherwise quiet residential enclave, and they view the expansion plans with
even greater concern. They anticipate increased levels of traffic and noise to
be generated throughout the day and into the night each day of the week,
adversely affecting the character of their neighborhood and lowering
property values.
At the hearing, the planning commissioners allow for two hours of
emotional presentations before concluding the public testimony. In the
discussions that follow, several commissioners are clearly uncertain about
how to proceed, and express concern both for the needs of the congregation
and for the interests of the residents. Two commissioners state that they
would like to see more analysis on nighttime noise impacts, weekend traffic
volumes, along with additional details on the landscaping plans and an
alternative daily schedule for the preschool. Ultimately, the commission
votes to delay any decision until its next meeting, and asks its staff to
provide additional information at that time.
At this particular moment in our hypothetical dispute, there is a
good opportunity to intervene using a mediated process. A concrete land
use proposal is on the table, the opposition to that proposal has surfaced,
and the important interests and issues have been identified. Yet it is still
early enough in the process that positions have only just been aired,
remaining tentative and subject to discussion and subject to the
development of further information. Importantly, no public allegations of
religious animus or discrimination have been made—at least not yet. The
city, being the regulatory authority charged with making the decision on the
application, may be in the best position to persuade the parties to try
mediation. A planning department staff member who is familiar with the
process might informally discuss the possibility with persons on each side
of the dispute, including the representatives of the congregation and the
lawyer for the newly formed neighborhood association. Alternatively, an
independent public policy mediator might be asked to conduct an
assessment of the dispute to determine the prospects for a successful
mediation, what the key issues are likely to be, and who the critical
stakeholders are that should be invited to participate in the mediation.
If a mediation process is thereafter convened, a face-to-face dialogue
among the various interested parties—at a minimum, representatives of the
applicant, the residents, and the city—can begin. In this dialogue the parties
will have a full opportunity to present their concerns in a setting conducive
to respectful listening and reasoned discussion. The benefits of the
mediation setting are due in part to the presence of a skilled neutral who has
gained the trust of the parties along with a commitment to try and
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understand each others’ views, but also due to the absence of a packed
hearing room and the imminent threat of an adverse decision hanging over
the proceedings. Under such circumstances, the parties are better able to
explore areas of mutual interest and agreement, to clarify areas of
disagreement or matters that require the development of further
information, to seek compromise on some matters and win-win solutions on
others, and, at a minimum, gain a better understanding of each other’s
needs, concerns, and viewpoints.
It seems likely in our hypothetical that, after having the opportunity
to sit down and discuss the issues with the aid of the mediator, the
congregation’s representatives will quickly see that the opposition of
surrounding residents stems from their fear of the impacts of the proposed
development, and is not the result of religious animus. Likewise,
neighborhood representatives will better understand the needs and
motivations driving the proposal, and this mutual understanding can provide
the basis not only for a creative resolution but also for productive future
relations. In contrast to this scenario, if mediation is not considered and the
congregation’s application is either denied or approved with unacceptable
conditions, the scene is set for a RLUIPA claim. Where an administrative
appeal is available or required, the congregation may begin to lay the
groundwork for a legal challenge by asserting that the city’s regulations—
either on their face or as applied by the planning commission—violate
RLUIPA.
And once this rights-based dynamic asserting religious
discrimination firmly takes hold, the stakes become higher and the dispute
will become much more difficult to entangle—even for the most skilled
mediator. With each allegation, insinuation, or even suspicion of religious
animus, community ties will be strained or broken, and the community’s
social fabric further distressed.
In summary, despite the potential for an acceptable resolution and
even mutual benefit in such disputes, if they devolve into claims of religious
discrimination there is a significant risk of harm to the affected
neighborhoods and communities. The next part examines this contention
more closely, focusing on the difficulties we, as Americans, experience
when attempting reasoned discussion and deliberations over public issues
involving religion, and why it is important that we find a way to do so.
III. RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
A. The Risk of Polarization in Arguments over Religion
In general, people who live in the same community will share many
concerns about environmental planning issues. These common interests
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both contribute to and provide an impetus for harmonious relations.
Disputes over traffic, noise, and aesthetics may generate a few impassioned
speeches, but are not frequently bitter and divisive in the long term. It is
much less likely, however, that a community will share common views
about religion to the same extent. Even people who share the same faith
may give religious considerations a very different priority when it comes to
land use issues that affect them personally.
With the passage of RLUIPA, disputes that once focused on
mundane planning issues such as traffic, noise, and aesthetics, become
contests over religious freedom and the place of religion in a liberal
democracy. Not only are there likely to be divergent views as to the
religious claims involved, but also there will be a tendency to engage in a
zero-sum contest of wills over these issues. Land use applicants who assert
religious reasons for the use of property gain the possibility of an exemption
from the zoning laws that apply to everybody else, and at the very least
obtain tremendous leverage from the highly credible threat of imposing
litigation costs and an award of attorney’s fees.60 Few, if any, such
applicants can be expected to forego the strategic advantage of a religious
discrimination claim.
The transformation of a land use dispute into a civil rights claim of
religious discrimination is problematic because it carries a significant risk
of polarization between the parties and in the community.61 Of course,
heated accusations and divisive partisanship are not limited to religious
issues, as anybody who has witnessed a public hearing over a controversial
land use matter can attest. But religion implicates core identity issues,
reliably causing disputants to act and react in defensive and sometimes
60

For example, according to a recent press report from the city of Ontario, California,
a congregation that had sought to build a new church settled their dispute with the city on
favorable terms once they had amended an existing complaint to include a RLUIPA claim.
Brenda Gazzar, Church Lawsuit Settled, Inland Valley Daily Bulletin, February 10, 2005.
City planners and neighbors had opposed the new church, citing concerns about traffic,
parking and disruption of economic plans for that area. Id. “I think the RLUIPA claim
changed the complexion of the case,” noted an attorney with a national organization who
had assisted the congregations with its RLUIPA claim, “That’s when the city wanted to
talk settlement.” Id. The City Manager of Ontario opined that the $150,000 the city agreed
to pay “was a good settlement because our attorneys certainly believed it was likely that the
city could lose the case, and that we could have to spend far more than what we settled
for.” Id. A member of the city council agreed, pointing out that, as he understood
RLUIPA, “there is no way the city can legally keep them from locating wherever they
please.” Id.
61
Professor Lipkin argues that religious arguments create a “Tower of Babel” of
political debate, that it “paradoxically personalizes and objectifies political debate, and…is
altogether too powerful for democratic purposes.” Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2027 n.9 and
accompanying text.
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extreme ways.62 Like disputes involving race and ethnicity, disputes that
divide along religious lines are particularly volatile and prone to
expressions of bigotry and hatred, leading in some instances to the use of
intimidation and violence.63 As Professor Nagel has stated about religious
argumentation in the context of the abortion debate:
It is so urgent and one-sided as to leave no room for broader
perspective or compromise. It makes opponents into enemies
and thus induces both hatred and a sense of futility. Worse,
these defects are progressive, for extreme moral claims of
this kind can be answered only by ratcheting up the intensity
of argumentation. As charges fly back and forth, even the
very basic inhibition against using falsehoods begins to drop
away. 64
In summary, RLUIPA is likely to bring religious discrimination
claims front and center in many land use disputes. Having previously
asserted that mediation is better suited to dealing with this difficult issue
than the current system of land use dispute resolution, the next section looks
more closely at the highly contested debate over religion in the public
square, and how that debate both makes clear the depth of the problem
identified, but also contains the seeds of a responsive approach to resolving
these disputes.
B. Religious Arguments in Public Discourse
A vigorous theoretical debate has accompanied the public shouting
over politically charged issues touching on religion, such as abortion,
school prayer, and the display of religious symbols on public property. The
debate concerns the propriety of religious arguments in deliberations and
decisions about legislation and public policy.65 Some legal commentators
62

See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 12 Cardozo Stud. L.
& Literature 1, 12 (2000) (“Issues concerning gender, race, and religion are laden with
emotion because they touch the sense of self.”).
63
The volatility of ethnic and religious conflict is perhaps more tragically evident
elsewhere in the world. See, e.g., VAMIK VOLKAN, BLOODLINES: FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO
ETHNIC TERRORISM (1997) (examining the role of ethnicity and religion in violent conflicts
around the world from the perspective of group identity formation and psychoanalytics).
64
ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 159 (2001) (quoted
in Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2027 n.9). Of course, the concern about extreme
argumentation is not limited to religious or even moral arguments, and may occur in almost
any context where a proponent aggressively pursues a position despite the lack of
acceptance by opponents of the argument’s premises. Conflicts touching on religion seem
particularly prone to this form of adversarialness, however.
65
See. e.g., Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2026 n.1 (compiling scholarly books and articles
on this issue). Lipkin divides the “warring factions” in this debate into the “inclusionists,”
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advocate for explicit recognition of religious moral values as the basis for at
least some government legislative and policy actions, pointing to “the
founders’ anchoring of American humans right upon sovereign
presupposition of a Creator.”66 Others tread more carefully around
Establishment Clause objections to the use of religious justifications for law
and policy, arguing that a “law that coincides with moral teachings of some
religion does not establish that religion.”67
For those who assume that such public discourse is or ought to be a
brawling, wide-open affair, it will come as something of a surprise that
there is any controversy at all.68 In any case, it is clear that many believe
that religious voices have been stifled or excluded from the debates over
legislation and policy.69
Assuming religious arguments are being excluded, why would
reasonable citizens seek to bar any sincerely held views from public
debates, even if founded in religious beliefs? A frequent target of
inclusionists is political theorist and philosopher John Rawls,70 who sought
who welcome religious arguments, and the “exclusionists,” who seek to limit debate to
secular arguments only. Id. at 2025.
66
Douglas W. Kmiec, Oh God! Can I Say That in Public?, 17 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics
& Pub. Pol’y 307, 312 (2003). Professor Kmiec further explains his view that such
explicit recognition was intended to protect individual liberty from the power of the state:
“Anchoring basic rights upon a metaphysical source is very much part of that structural
separation, for without God, the law is invited to become god.” Id. at 313.
67
Laycock, supra note 33, at 1082 (discussing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-20
(1980)).
68
See. e.g., Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2033 (“According to the conventional view in
American politics, the public square should be unrestricted and include robust, vigorous
debate.”).
69
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the
Death Penalty, 17 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 541, 546 (2003) (“That religious
believers should be speaking at all is, as it turns out, hardly less contested than the
substance of what we are called to say.”). Others dispute this claim, however. Professor
Blumoff, for example, argues that “‘God-talk’ enjoys a robust and seeming omnipresence
in our public life.” Theodore Y. Blumoff, The New Religionists’ Newest Social Gospel:
On the Rhetoric and Reality of Religions’ ‘Marginalization’ in Public Life, 51 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1, 6 (1996). “As an empirical matter,” Blumoff notes, “there is indisputable evidence
of both the prevalence and the influence of religious organizations on public policy.” Id. at
14. In contrast, he asserts, “not a shred of empirical evidence supports the claim that
religion has in fact been marginalized.” Id. at 10
70
See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Framing the Public Square God’s Name in Vain: The
Wrongs and Rights of Religion in Politics, 91 Geo. L. J. 183, 185 (2002) (book review)
(calling the work of Rawls the “leading source” for such arguments); Garnett, supra note
69, at 546 (identifying Rawls with this position); Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From)
Enlightenment?, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1263, 1279 (2004) (calling Rawls “the most
influential contemporary American theorist” associated with the effort to distinguish the
religious from the secular in political and democratic discourse). According to Professor
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to describe a theory of democracy in a pluralistic society that was just and
stable.
Rawls held that just and acceptable laws and public policy will be
possible in areas of “overlapping consensus” where citizens agree on certain
essential features of their democracy, and therefore citizens should only rely
on political arguments that might reasonably appeal to all citizens.71 The
chief enemy of such a democracy is, in this view, fundamentalism—
whether religious or philosophical—or what Rawls referred to as
“comprehensive doctrines.”72
Rawls’ formulation sprang from the
recognition and acceptance of a politically and religiously plural society.73
From that premise, he argued that it is not reasonable for some citizens to
impose any one comprehensive doctrine on others.74 Thus, arguments that
rely on religious texts for their authority are, in this view, politically
unreasonable because they would not appeal to all citizens in a democracy
where religious freedom and pluralism are taken seriously.75 Such
arguments, accordingly, result in incommensurate discourse and a

Lipkin, “Rawls’s notion of ‘public reason’ is an exclusionist view and relies on a notion of
‘reasonableness.’” Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2045 n.74.
71
See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Fundamentalism From the Perspective of Liberal
Tolerance, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1631, 1632 (2003) (summarizing and defending Rawls’
support for excluding “politically unreasonable” arguments from public discourse).
72
Id. at 1632-34. According to Professor Griffin, Rawls stated his objection to
religious arguments as follows: “How is it possible for those holding religious doctrines,
some based on religious authority, for example, the Church or the Bible, to hold at the
same time a reasonable political conception that supports a reasonable constitutional
democratic regime?” Id. at 1632, (quoting JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 588 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999)).
73
Id. at 1632.
74
Id.
75
Professor Greenawalt also makes this point, highlighting what he sees as the danger
of allowing such arguments:
If freedom of religion exists, diverse religious views are bound to
emerge and continue; religion engenders such strong passions that it will
inevitably be a source of tension; and that tension will be aggravated by
reliance on religious grounds in political decisions and arguments.
Relatedly, social unity in liberal democracies will always be fragile
enough so that argument in terms of nonaccessible grounds will be
harmful.
KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 130 (1995),
quoted in Annette Bulger Mathis, Comment, Judges, Thou Shalt Not Use Thine Own
Religion In Thy Opinions, 23 Miss. C. L. Rev. 131, 132 (2004). Cf., Martha Minow, On
Being a Religious Professional: The Religious Turn in Professional Ethics, 180 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 661, 672 (2001) (noting “the incendiary effects of governments and political actors
mobilizing people around political differences in places such as Bosnia, Israel, and
Northern Ireland.”).
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breakdown of the deliberative aspects of civic debate.76
Suffice it to say that the debate over the role of religion in public
discourse has been long and passionate, and the competing inclusionist and
exclusionist viewpoints will not be easily reconciled.77 Undaunted by this
challenge, Robert Lipkin offers what he calls his “reconstruction thesis.”
Professor Lipkin argues that all sides in a reasonable democratic debate
must, after initially stating their views on the issues, “reconstruct” their
respective arguments; this step, he says, is an effort “to formulate, in a
common framework or discourse, different and sometimes
incommensurable perspectives.”78
Stated more plainly, Lipkin’s idea is that all participants must be
allowed to present their views in whatever terms they see fit, but after doing
so they must next be prepared to “reconstruct” their arguments in a manner
and in a language which is accessible to others—if not, “the conversation
abruptly comes to an end.”79 This obligation does not apply just to those
holding religious viewpoints and concerns, of course. Those who do not
share, or give a different priority to, particular religious concerns may also
need to reconstruct their own arguments so that those with religious

76

See Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2027 (arguing that religious arguments can “create a
divisive ‘Tower of Babel’ of political debate, and tend to stop meaningful political debate
dead in its track.”). Cf. Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 Ariz. St.
L. J. 473, 480 (1997) (summarizing John Dewey’s views, and stating that Dewey believed
“there can be no search for the truth when persons merely shout at each other.”).
77
Nor is it not my purpose here to take sides in or reconcile the various arguments.
Rather, I am concerned here with how, in the context of religious land use disputes, people
with different views might best attempt to resolve their conflict. I suspect that many
political actors on both sides in this debate, along with at least some legal commentators,
pay little attention to the question of reconciliation. There are, after all, potential
advantages to be obtained by encouraging division, including the hope of gaining a more
complete victory. With this same concern in mind, Professor Lopez warns that “the
division of citizens into religious factions that ‘vex and oppress’ one another for political
ends exacts a substantial toll on society because the clash inevitably creates winners and
losers based upon the number of adherents, information, wealth, or the like.” Lopez, supra
note 32, at 174 (quoting The Federalist No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
78
See Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2029.
79
Id. at 2073. Lipkin adds: “This impasse prompted Richard Rorty to characterize
religious arguments as ‘conversation-stoppers.’ The reason religious discourse can be a
conversation-stopper is not because the non-religious citizen arbitrarily refuses to continue,
but because the parameters for continuing are totally obscure.” Id. at 2073 n.174 (citing
Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, 3 Common Knowledge 1, 2 (1994)).
And if no attempt is made to bridge such divides, Professor Minow warns us, “the
prospects for communication across different groups grow very dim, and the occasions for
using religious authority as a club—of both the weapon and social variety—jeopardizes
equality, participation, and mutual exchange.” Minow, supra note 75, at 686.
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viewpoints and concerns can understand them.80
Lipkin provides several examples of reconstructed rhetoric from the
oratory of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.. Dr. King’s messages, he
argues, were aimed at other Christians, but also at other religious-minded
individuals and secular audiences as well.81 Though filled with religious
language and references, King’s was “a universal ethical discourse,” which
spoke of the reciprocal duties of each citizen towards the mutual benefit of
all.82 Even statements utterly shorn of religious references, such as King’s
“I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you ought to be. And
you can never be what you ought to be until I am what I ought to be,”
reverberate powerfully with common ethical and moral concerns.83
What is of primary interest here is that Lipkin’s notion of
reconstruction—his response to the quandary of religious argumentation—
has a direct parallel in mediation. Parties in mediation enter into a dialogue
whereby they attempt to reach an understanding of their differences, and
then seek to resolve them. This effort requires that the parties, with the aid
of the mediator, attempt to describe their point of view in a way that can be
understood, if not accepted as true, by the other disputants. This concerted
attempt to restate and to explain—to reframe, in the mediator’s parlance—is
similar to Lipkin’s notion of reconstruction, and is likewise aimed at
establishing common ground or a common language upon which the parties
can then seek an acceptable resolution.
The analogy to mediation is especially clear in the way Lipkin
describes the stages of political justification in a democracy. According to
Lipkin, these are: 1) the presentment stage, a “[n]o holds barred” exchange
of views among all-comers; 2) the reconstruction stage, the attempt to state
these views in “a common language with shared principles of reasoning”; 3)
the argument stage, where options for resolving the issues identified during
the first two stages are considered and contested; and 4) the judgment stage,
where the decision is made on a course of action, stated in terms
understandable to all. 84
Lipkin’s stages closely parallel the structural elements of mediation
as commonly described by theorists and practitioners.85 Following
80

See Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2073.
Id. at 2043.
82
Id. at 2043-44.
83
Id. at 2043 (quoting from Martin Luther King, Jr., Remaining Awake Through a
Great Revolution, in A KNOCK AT MIDNIGHT: INSPIRATION FROM THE GREAT SERMONS OF
REVEREND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 205, 208 (Clayborne Carson & Peter Holloran eds.,
1998)).
84
Id., at 2051-52.
85
See, e.g., MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELLE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION
25-27 (1996) (describing the stages of mediation to include “information gathering and
81
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introductions and other preliminaries, the mediator often invites the parties
to offer an opening presentation or narrative description of the origins and
nature of the dispute. This feature tracks Lipkin’s presentment stage of
political justification. The initial foray into the background dispute is often
followed by an effort by the mediator to foster a common understanding
among the parties about the nature of the dispute and the issues that need to
be addressed, which parallels Lipkin’s reconstruction stage. Next, in
mediation, it is common to engage the parties in generating and analyzing
available options and strategies for resolving the dispute, a task roughly
analogous to the argument stage—though in mediation this frequently
involves a problem-solving or cooperative effort, as opposed to an
adversarial contest. Then, finally, as with Lipkin’s judgment stage, their
comes a time in mediation to decide on a course of action.
Lipkin believes that the task of reconstruction is critical to creating a
public discourse where people with differing (and even incommensurate)
views about religion can nonetheless act deliberatively to decide important
matters of law and policy. Likewise, mediation, with its focus on creating
understandings among parties holding differing views and concerns, offers
perhaps the best means for resolving many religious land use disputes.86 As
explained in Part I, the existing quasi-judicial system for resolving religious
land use disputes lacks precisely this sort of opportunity for opponents to
directly exchange views and engage in the hard work of dialogue. In
contrast, mediation allows the parties to talk directly with each other with
the aid of a skilled neutral, and holds out the possibility of working through
potentially divisive issues around religion. Furthermore, if the issues are
issue identification,” followed by “agenda setting,” then “resolving each issue,” and
“reaching agreement”). Cf. Richard M Cartier, Mediating Local Intergovernmental
Disputes—Reflections on the Process, 13 San Joaquin Agricultural L. Rev. 1, 3-8 (2003)
(describing the “classical” model of mediation as including: a statement of the problem by
the parties; information gathering; problem identification; problem solving; and writing of
an agreement). This basic structure is found as well in the final draft of the Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators being developed jointly by the American Bar
Association, the American Arbitration Association, and the Association for Conflict
Resolution, available at http://www.acrnet.org/pdfs/modelstandards12-29-2004.pdf
(“Mediation serves various purposes, including opportunities for the parties to define and
clarify issues, understand different perspectives, identify interests, explore and assess
possible solutions, and reach mutually satisfactory agreements, when desired.”).
86
There are mediators for whom, and forms of mediation in which, facilitating a
dialogue between the disputants is not always encouraged and not thought to be crucial to
the process. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-connected Mediation:
What’s Justice Got to do with It?, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 787, 809-13 (2001) (describing the
reduced role of disputants in court-connected mediation). When I refer to mediation in this
paper, however, I mean to suggest a process that includes an effort to create such a
dialogue.
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developed enough so that mediation can profitably occur prior to public
hearings, they can be addressed before positions harden and the dispute
becomes front-page fodder.
Central to this argument is the understanding that mediation does
not seek to exclude the idiosyncratic views of the participants about the
history and nature of the dispute.87 The parties need not avoid talking about
their respective religious beliefs, motivations, or aspirations. Indeed,
disputants will likely respond positively when they feel they have been
genuinely heard and understood.88 A negotiation or mediation will often
see little or no significant headway until one or more parties’ point of view
has been at least acknowledged.89
The point is crucial, as people with religious viewpoints may enter
the mediation concerned that their views will not listened to or understood.
They may believe, in the words of Stephen Carter, that their voices are not
“welcome[d]…taken seriously, respected, and honored” in the debates over
important public issues.90 Whether this true or not seems largely beside the
point if the sentiment is widely shared.91 Because the national debates over
87

Cf. R. Lisle Baker, Using Insights About Perception and Judgment from the MyersBriggs Type Indicator Instrument as an Aid to Mediation, 9 Harv. Negot. L. Rev.115, 12930 (2004) (“The chance for parties to tell their stories as they prefer is a part of mediation’s
value because disputants may not have the same chance in court.”)
88
Cf. DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT
MATTERS MOST 163 (Penguin Books 2000) (1999) (“[W]e [all] have a deep desire to feel
heard, and to know that others care enough to listen.”). See also BENNETT & HERMANN,
supra note 85, at 41 (“mediators must create an environment where feelings can be
verbalized safely and the parties feel that they are heard and understood”).
89
See Baker, supra note 87, at 130 (observing that “until these stories are told, it will
be challenging for a party to move beyond them towards resolution.”). After this point is
reached, however, I agree with Professor Lipkin that people on both (or all) sides of the
dispute have a duty, as a matter of “civic virtue,” to argue or explain themselves in terms—
in a language, even—that is accessible to the comprehension and analysis of those who do
not share the speaker’s specific religious, moral, or philosophical commitments. See
Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2048.
90
Wexler, supra note 70, at 189 (quoting STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN:
THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS 42). But see Blumoff, supra note 69, at
10, 14 (denying any empirical basis for such claims).
91
Sometimes perception is reality, in other words. However, I have found no studies
regarding the prevalence of the belief among Americans that religious-based views are not
welcomed in the so-called public square. This might be a useful question to pursue. For
my purposes here, I assume with others that the widespread and frequent expression of this
belief among religious elites and opinion makers has the intended impact of influencing
grass level beliefs and attitudes, and that, in turn, it is likely to be reflected in religious land
use disputes at the local level. Cf. Schragger, supra note 8, at 1820 (observing that as
national political debates involving religion have become more polarized, “local
negotiations over religion’s place in public discourse have become increasingly difficult.”).
See also, infra at note 93.

31-Mar-06]

Jeffrey H. Goldfien

29

religion naturally find their way into the local discourse of communities and
religious congregations,92 when land use disputes turn into claims of
religious discrimination—as they will under RLUIPA—these same
contentious dynamics will be likely in play.
Should we care if differences over religion result in more acrimony
down at city hall, or in the courthouse? Isn’t that how democracy works?
The next section argues that how we dispute matters, and that efforts to
resolve religious land use conflicts through mediation can avoid or repair
damaged relationships, leading to more robust communities.
C. Conflict and Community
Religious land use disputes are primarily local conflicts over “the
normative content of public life,” rather than simple reflections of larger
social issues being played out on the national scene.93 And the choice of
disputing process is important: the manner and skillfulness with which it is
employed, along with the substantive outcome, become feedback in the
loop that continually shapes the evolving nature and quality of community
life.94
Community exists alongside liberty and equality as a fundamental—
if at times under appreciated—value in American democracy.95
92

See, e.g., Karst, supra note 62, at 9 (“To the extent that the social issues concern
religion directly—say, school prayers or religious exemptions from civil rights laws—our
local religious congregations are natural loci for explicit discussion.”). See also, infra note
93.
93
Schragger, supra note 8, at 1874. Nonetheless, as infra, these national debates
appear to influence the attitudes and beliefs of citizens at the local level.
94
Ackerman, supra note 7, at 53-82 (comparing the impact on communities of
litigation, arbitration, and mediation). Cf. Karst, supra note 62, at 24 (“Behavior is not just
something in brute nature to be talked about and named; it has its own role in creating,
reinforcing, or undermining meanings.”). Professor Ackerman is careful to point out the
instrumental nature of dispute resolution techniques: “All dispute resolution processes
have elements conducive to communitarianism, yet all such choices can be employed in a
manner detrimental to building community.” Ackerman, supra note 7, at 53. He does not
dismiss nor even denigrate the importance of litigation as a tool for resolving conflicts and
providing other benefits for communities. Nor is his hope—or mine, for that matter—to
simply reduce conflict by avoiding it; rather, encouraging mediation is meant to counter the
lack of community engagement which itself may evidence a tendency towards conflict
avoidance. Id. at 40.
95
Post, supra note 76, at 482 (“democracy presupposes community”); Lipkin, supra
note 32, at 2029 n.17 (“[A]spiring towards ‘communitarian democracy’ is precisely, in my
view, what prompted the Founding.”). Lipkin elaborates on his notion as follows:
[W]e might usefully regard the United States as aspiring towards an
"American communitarian republic," consisting of a community of
democrats committed to creating the conditions for the mutual
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Relationships between individuals are the basic currency of communities of
all types, providing the building blocks for the social networks that
constitute a community’s lifeblood and identity. Therefore, many social
observers view with concern the decline in participation in community
institutions and civic activities that, historically, have provided a major
source of “social capital” in communities. 96 The fear is that declining
stores of social capital will undermine the healthy functioning of local
communities, both adversely affecting the quality of life for individuals in
the community as well as constituting a drag on the greater polity.97
Retaining the right to adjudicate such disputes is fundamental, of
course. Moreover, the existence of legal rights and the availability of
formal adjudicatory processes to enforce them provide an important context
recognition of each other's good. Essentially, the American
communitarian republic consists of diverse individuals adhering to
conflicting conceptions of the good life who recognize that individuality
and diversity in part defines their political identities. The American
communitarian republic examines the possibility that such individuals
can form a community which protects their individuality and diversity
and which fosters self-government and the commitment to the equal
freedom of its members. The idea of the American communitarian
republic explains community in terms of a reciprocal commitment to
certain types of procedures for resolving social conflict and measuring
change. One way of understanding these procedures is in terms of truth.
On this view, truth is the result, often provisionally acknowledged, of
interacting, especially through, but not limited to, deliberating with other
members of the political community. We not only find truth through
these interactions, but more important, the appropriate kinds of
interactions with others constitute the nature of at least one important
kind of truth, namely, political truth.
Id. Lipken, then, also finds inherent meaning in the nature and quality of our
social relationships, and not simply their products.
96
Ackerman, supra note 7, at 28-29 (discussing the work of political scientist Robert
Putnam, and defining social capital as “the connections between individuals that build
social networks [and which are] seen as critical to the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that allow us to function in civil society.”).
97
The position that, generally, the needs of community have lately been subjugated to
the concerns of individual liberty is frequently identified with the communitarian
movement or philosophy. Id. In his insightful article, Disputing Together: Conflict
Resolution and the Search for Community, Professor Ackerman draws upon the
communitarian perspective to examine the impact of how we choose to dispute. I draw on
his work to argue that, in the case of religious land use disputes, communities will
experience significant “centrifugal” (i.e., divisive) forces due to the likelihood, under the
RLUIPA regime, that land owners with plausible religious motivations will choose (or at
least threaten) to litigate rather than negotiate their conflicts with their neighbors and their
community. Id. at 55. Thus, I share, to this extent, the communitarian concern about
tending to the health of our civic communities. For a broader and more detailed
exploration of communitarian theory, however, I highly recommend Ackerman’s article.
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for religious land use disputes and, more generally, for the broader range of
community disputes. For example, adjudication provides guidance or
norms that reflect the broader sense of the community about the expected
substantive outcome of disputes.98 Resort to adjudication is an affirmation
of community values in so far as the parties place their dispute (and their
faith) in the hands of community representatives, in the interest of resolving
the matter peacefully.99 The handing down of decisions from an authority
figure or figures, after a fair hearing, may also fit more easily currently
popular conceptions of justice, so that traditional disputing methods may be
imbued with a greater sense of legitimacy.
Lastly, authoritative
interpretations of law are sometimes needed and may have a “cathartic”
effect, even for losing parties.100
Despite these virtues, adjudication in the American vein relies on
adversarial assumptions that, on the whole, tend to separate people rather
than build cooperative relationships and social capital. The design of the
formal litigation process—indeed, the very design of the courtroom—is
intended to separate and “minimize engagement between the parties.”101 As
discussed in Part I, the land use process, which is a form of local
administrative adjudication, has inherited these assumptions and attributes
of the adjudicatory model. Thus, the land use process typically places
stakeholders on an adversarial footing from the moment a project is
proposed.
Reliance on adversarial disputing can lead to a “self-absorbed
preoccupation with individual rights to the derogation of community
interests and needs.”102 The resulting “rights talk,” according to Mary Ann
Glendon, “in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens
social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus,
accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground.”103 Rights
talk is precisely what predominates when disputes over the impacts of
98

Post, supra note 76, at 477 (stating that an important function of law “is the
articulation and enforcement of community norms.”). In this sense, as the holder and
vehicle for enforcement of such legal rights, communities serve as a “container for
conflict.” Ackerman, supra note 7, at 47. Cf., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale
L. J. 1073, 1089 (1984) (arguing that civil litigation is “an institutional arrangement for
using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.”). Indeed, its
supporters may hope that RLUIPA, rather than resulting in a wave of litigation, instead
brings about more favorable administrative zoning decisions for religious property owners
that, in turn, reflect new community attitudes of religious tolerance.
99
Ackerman, supra note 7, at 55-56.
100
Id. at 58.
101
Id. at 57.
102
Id. at 56.
103
MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 14 (1991), quoted in Ackerman, supra note 7, at 56.

32

MEDIATING RELIGIOUS LAND USE DISPUTES

[4/5/2006

development are transformed into debates about religious values and
beliefs. A statute such as RLUIPA, designed to encourage this divisive
dynamic, raises serious concerns both because of the public nature of the
disputes and the potential they hold to broadly affect disputing behavior
within the communities.104 As Kenneth Karst argues, the resulting discord
“tends to perpetuate itself,”105 depleting community’s store of social capital.
These are disputes that, literally, hit close to home. Like disputes involving
family, those between neighbors become overheated and personal very
quickly. Adding religion into that mix only makes things more volatile.
The need to resolve religious land use disputes is in tension but not
incompatible with the goal of strengthening community.106 Conflict is
inevitable, but the disintegration of community bonds is not. Indeed, how
effectively residents respond to conflict is a measure of a community’s
health. Generally, an early intervention that allows neighbors to sit down
together, to talk and listen to one another, and to deliberate about how to
move forward, offers the hope of slowing the seemingly inevitable march to
the (federal) courthouse. Collaborative dispute resolution processes such as
mediation offer that opportunity, and have greater potential not just to avoid
depletion of social capital but to add to it, while also enhancing the
problem-solving capacity of communities.107
And so mediating religious land use disputes offers an opportunity
to communities, but also a challenge. For this suggestion to work,
communities must accept the burden and responsibility of resolving their
conflicts together, instead of resorting to the default of adversarial
adjudication.108 Residents and local government officials will need to
depart from established patterns and procedures, and commit their time,
energy, and resources to perhaps unfamiliar collaborative processes.

104

Ackerman, supra note 7, at 33-34 (arguing that land use disputes have “public
implications” and “may have a broad substantive impact on the community”).
105
Karst, supra note 62, at 16.
106
See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 7, at 37 (“The effort of individuals to resolve their
disputes and the desire to reinforce the societal fabric are, more often then not, compatible
goals.”).
107
See id. at 71-72 (“The process can be inherently fulfilling, and can provide the
parties with the tools to resolve future problems, develop relationships and build social
capital.”). Professor Ackerman insists “we delude ourselves if we think that adjudicative
dispute resolution processes can serve as a surrogate for the types of community bonds that
can be forged only in the absence of coercion.” Id. at 32. He rightly cautions, however,
that even mediation “requires conscious use of process in a manner conducive to personal
interaction, mutual recognition, and a sense that the parties and their dispute are part of a
larger tapestry,” lest it fall into a “self-indulgent” and “empty ritual.” Id. at 30-31.
108
As Professor Ackerman states succinctly, “collaboration can be hard work.” Id. at
72.
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Effective mediation demands patience, maturity, flexibility, and openness to
opportunities for mutual accommodation.
This may be a tall order for many communities. Adversarial
strategies are a powerful habit for individuals, institutions, and for
communities as well. Adjudication to many seems like the “natural” way to
resolve disputes. For some, it will be easier to ask a judge to decide who is
right and who is wrong. Indeed, one attraction of both litigation and
administrative land use proceedings is that they shift responsibility for
resolving the conflict away from the disputants. For local government
officials, mindful of the political costs of making hard choices, the
temptation to “punt” a problem to the courts may be irresistible.
In contrast, mediation requires that disputants—including the local
zoning officials—take responsibility for finding a solution themselves. And
this autonomy is precisely the foremost advantage of mediation. After all,
those closest to the dispute are often in a better position to resolve it, simply
because they are the driving force and they know best what their own needs
and interests require.109 When disputants “own” the process, it stands to
reason that they will embrace the fruits of their efforts, thus enhancing
legitimacy and compliance.
To summarize, mediation can empower community members to
participate in productive civic engagements, which should yield benefits in
the form of increased social capital and a better overall quality of individual
and communal life.110 Changing in this way how individuals and
109

Id. at 75 (“People usually are better equipped to order their lives and resolve their
problems on their own accord.”).
110
Id. at 80 (“the true promise of mediation…involves a process of empowerment and
recognition that shifts disputants from weakness and dependency to strength, from selfabsorption to responsiveness.”). Professor Schragger likewise cites the importance for
communal life of constructive public disputing at the local level:
The strength of the civic community is that it generates crosscutting
communal norms through a public and democratic process, and that it
does so on behalf of citizens, not just private parties. There is powerful
value to fostering the negotiation of public values in this type of
association. Indeed, commentators express alarm that the legal and
philosophical favoring of private associational life over public
associational life is corrosive of civic engagement. Those who believe
that participation in the process of governing is essential to a wellfunctioning democracy view the decrease in local civic role as
particularly dangerous to the republic, a sign of the decay of democratic
virtue. This ideal places civic engagement at the center of individual
virtue, and views the norms of citizenship as central to achievement of
the good life. Bypassing those public institutions that are well-scaled for
participatory activity narrows the space for the public negotiation of
communal values and shifts those debates into the private sphere.
Schragger, supra note 8, at 1887-88 (footnotes omitted).
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communities view and attempt to resolve their conflicts can change the very
culture of that community. It is in local settings and through local
institutions that individual identity and character are most powerfully
influenced.111 Indeed, it is precisely in the content and form of
communications within families, congregations, and communities—what
Professor Karst refers to as “local discourse”—that we learn and embody
disputing behaviors, and other aspects of culture:
If a culture is a community of meaning, local discourse is the
port of entry into that community. The conversations and
other communicative interactions of ordinary life are, from
childhood on, the stuff of world-making. Language is part of
this discourse, but we also communicate meanings—our
understandings of the world, our intentions, our convictions,
our capacities—by our actions. We learn to assign meanings
to our own behavior and to others’ behavior, and all these
assignments of meaning add up to the culture in which we
live.112
In other words, if we are to build communities that dispute well, we must do
so from the ground up. Similar notions undergird other community-centric
forms of dispute resolution such as victim-offender mediation and
community boards.113 Like those initiatives, however, use of mediation in
land use disputes generally, much less religious land use disputes, has yet to
gain widespread acceptance. What, then, are the obstacles to realizing the
potential benefits of mediation? Part IV explores this question, and offers
recommendations for overcoming these barriers.
IV. POTENTIAL OBSTACLES AND OBJECTIONS TO MEDIATION

111

Karst, supra note 62, at 2-5.
Karst, supra note 62, at 3. Corporate America is discovering the power of local
discourse, and some companies have developed “word of mouth” marketing campaigns,
involving the targeted recruitment of volunteer consumers who are provided free samples
of products and asked to (surreptitiously) let friends and acquaintances know about their
experiences with them. See Rob Walker, The Hidden (In Plain Sight) Persuaders, N.Y.
Times, December 5, 2004, Section 6, at 69, available at 2004 WLNR 13102193.
113
See, e.g., Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production:
The Making of Community Mediation, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 709, 714-723 (1988)
(reviewing the history of community dispute resolution centers and identifying their
primary purposes as being the delivery of dispute resolution services, transformation of
society, and personal growth). See also PAUL WAHRHAFTIG, COMMUNITY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, EMPOWERMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS, HISTORY AND FUTURE
OF A MOVEMENT 19 (2004) (analogizing the benefits of a community dispute resolution
program to an iceberg, in that only 10% is visible in the delivery of services, but that 90%
of the benefit, in the form of community empowerment, is obscured from view).
112
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Resolving religious land use disputes presents a difficult challenge
for local communities, due both to the religious content and to the
shortcomings of existing land use procedures. Mediation is not an easy
alternative, however, nor does it represent an unalloyed good. To borrow
Archbishop Tutu’s metaphor for religion, any dispute resolution technique
is like a knife: equally useful to create a feast, or to disembowel an
adversary.114 Disputants should give careful consideration to advantages
and disadvantages before choosing an available dispute resolution option.115
With this in mind, this part examines the likely concerns and obstacles to
using mediation in the context of a religious land use dispute.
First, the existing culture of local government may pose a significant
obstacle to implementing mediation. It is not easy to change the habits and
beliefs of an organization, and bureaucracies—including those at the local
government level—can be especially resistant to change. In two decades of
advising parties on all sides of local land use disputes, the author has not
seen a significant shift towards more collaborative models of decisionmaking.116 While commentators have often endorsed the use of mediation
in land use disputes,117 local officials may be reluctant to consider it, fearing
a loss of influence over the decision making process.118
114

Arlene Getz, ‘Religion is Morally Neutral’: Desmond Tutu Discusses the Tsunami
Tragedy, God, Iraq and the Ee-election of George W. Bush, Newsweek, December 30,
2004 (web edition, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6769686/site/newsweek/)
(last checked April 5, 2006). Here is the full quote:
I keep having to remind people that religion in and of itself is
morally neutral. Religion is like a knife. When you use a knife for cutting
up bread to prepare sandwiches, a knife is good. If you use the same
knife to stick into somebody’s guts, a knife is bad. Religion in and of
itself is not good or bad—it is what it makes you do.
115
Commentators, of course, should likewise take care in prescribing any particular
approach, and that is the underlying purpose of present article.
116
An exception to this general observation may be in the area of long-range
community planning, where local governments have begun to convene facilitated
community-wide processes that bring together stakeholder groups in an effort to develop
and achieve consensus about future goals and aspirations. I have not seen a similar shift in
local government thinking in the area of resolving disputes. There is some movement in
the developer community, however, which increasingly includes collaborative techniques
among its best practices for development proposals. See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 30, at
525 (recommending that developers use mediation for difficult or controversial land use
proposals).
117
See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Golden and its Emanations: The Surprising Origins of
Smart Growth, 35 Urb. Law. 15, 72-3 (2003) (calling for continued encouragement of
mediation in connection with other “smart growth” urban planning strategies).
118
See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 241-42 (1987) (pointing out
that public officials usually retain decision making authority, and that consensual processes
will likely enhance their power because the public favors the better outcomes that these
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Nonetheless, the highly contested nature of religious land use
disputes may eventually encourage local officials to try mediation. For one
thing, local officials’ natural aversion to making unpopular decisions could
lead them to loosen their control over the decision-making process. Indeed,
fear of blame might lead a zoning official to make a decision he or she
thinks is popular with large numbers of voters, even where the decision is
questionable as a legal matter and there is exposure to costly litigation.119
Mediation effects a sharing of responsibility for the process—and,
therefore, the result—among those most directly interested in the dispute. If
local officials believe that mediation can result in a solution acceptable to
all parties involved, they may be very happy indeed to adopt it in their own
formal decision on the matter.
Another likely obstacle to choosing mediation is the lack of
resources for new programs at the local government and community level.
With so many competing demands for services, and a political climate that
makes finding new revenue sources exceedingly difficult, local
governments have been suffering from financial difficulty and uncertainty
for many years now. While, in a sense, it is a matter of reconsidering
priorities, local governments can be shy about launching new initiatives in
an era where securing adequate funding for even basic services has become
difficult. It may be possible to convince public officials that there are
community-building benefits to collaborative dispute resolution methods, or
even that it could save them money on legal costs if they avoid litigation,
but there will be for many a natural inclination to stay the course.
The issue of cost savings is a challenging one because the existing
system of processing land use disputes can and often appears to be very
efficient. It is difficult to imagine, for example, a controversial religious
land use dispute being resolved through mediation in just one evening
session. Yet, many public hearings on land use matters are concluded in
that time. Moreover, because employing mediation does not avoid the need
to process land use applications in accord with basic administrative
procedures, nor replace the public hearing, mediation might appear to be an
expensive “add on.”
Also, the traditional administrative procedures serve important
purposes and are legally required in most instances. They operate
structurally to retain the ultimate locus for decision making in a
democratically constituted and accountable local government, and provide a
context of public values that must be the background for such disputes.120
processes provide).
119
This, of course, is a concern for minority faith communities, who fear exclusion by
mainline religious and secular interests through zoning decisions.
120
Thus mediation is best viewed, in the words of Professor Susskind, as “an important
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Religious land use disputes involve public as well as private interests, and
the overlay of a public process, along with the involvement of public
officials, is necessary for the success of the mediation and to provide an
important element of legitimacy.121
Mediation, then, may be resisted because of its potential to increase
costs in terms of the time and resources devoted to the process by local
government and other interested parties, and in terms of the costs and
associated overhead for the mediator and the mediation process itself. For
the property owner, the holding costs of the land could add up quickly, or
financial options may lapse, if a decision is much prolonged by negotiation
and mediation efforts. Yet there appear to be real cost savings possible
from cooperative decision making, not the least of which is avoiding
consultant and legal fees prior to and during litigation, which may quickly
render insignificant the costs of the mediation process. There is also the
social capital and community good will to be gained when citizens work
collaboratively to solve problems that implicate mutual concerns.
Aside from costs, there must also be concern that mediation of this
sort not be used to avoid public scrutiny. Almost all jurisdictions have open
meeting laws, public records requirements, and conflict of interest
regulations; it is no less important to comport with the public values
represented by these types of statutes when resolving a public dispute using
mediation than with other public processes. These forms of official
transparency and accountability, too, will increase the legitimacy of any
agreement reached through mediation.
A final significant concern about recommending mediation in the
case of religious land use disputes is that it might be used to disadvantage
non-mainstream groups and individuals who do not hold to more
conventional religious views or practices. To repeat: the instrumental
nature of mediation will not prevent its use for less than admirable
purposes.122 Any recommendation of mediation must respond to the
concern that the process does not become a vehicle for oppression of
minority interests or views, or for the denial of fundamental rights.
supplement to the traditional administrative, political and legal tools typically used to
resolve land use disputes.” See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., CONSENSUS BUILDING
INSTITUTE, USING ASSISTED NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE LAND USE DISPUTES: A GUIDE FOR
PUBLIC OFFICIALS 1 (1999). The main thrust of the present article, then, is that mediation
appears to be particularly appropriate in the case of religious land use disputes.
121
Cf., DAVID LAMPE & MARSHALL KAPLAN, RESOLVING LAND-USE CONFLICTS
THROUGH MEDIATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND
POLICY WORKING PAPER 2 (1999) (analyzing eight case studies of land use mediation and
concluding that the failure to involve elected and appointed officials could “prolong a
dispute-resolution process substantially and unnecessarily.”).
122
See supra note 94, note 114 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Mediation holds particular promise for communities facing religious
land use disputes, though care must be taken to ensure it is used
appropriately. Thus, it is important that a party’s decision to enter into and
participate in mediation is well informed, as well as voluntary and not even
subtly coerced. Public officials or employees representing the decision
making body should avoid any suggestion that the refusal of a party or
person to participate in mediation will be held against them in subsequent
proceedings. Also, mediation must not be a substitute for, nor a prerequisite
(and thus an additional barrier) to, an official decision by the decision
making body, or for obtaining judicial review. While such requirements
may encourage people to try mediation, they may also discourage or deny
legitimate expectations of access to governmental process and decisions.
Nor should any persons or organizations be excluded from mediation or
deprived of any information gathered in that process because they lack the
ability to pay a share of the costs. In summary, mediation should not be an
impediment to achieving a fair and just resolution.
There will be instances in which the need to vindicate rights through
litigation outweighs the benefits obtainable through mediation. In rare
cases, the parties will need to protect fundamental interests that cannot be
compromised. At other times, the parties will simply not be able or willing
to accommodate each other. For these reasons and others, access to
administrative and judicial forums must be preserved. Similarly, there will
likely be disputes in the near term in which important questions about the
scope and effect of RLUIPA remain unresolved by the courts, leaving the
parties unable to make good decisions about settlement. Relatively more
cases will require litigation at this early stage in the statute’s history, as
some number of cases must go through the appeal process in order to shape
the legal landscape and set the parameters of parties’ reasonable
expectations, thus conducing settlement of later claims.123
Despite its promise, there are likely to be political and practical
obstacles to employing mediation at the local level. Perhaps ironically, the
best strategy for overcoming these obstacles—at least in any programmatic
fashion—may be to focus at the state level.124 State government authority
123

See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979) (arguing that parties’ expectations
about possible litigated outcomes influence bargaining behavior).
124
While land use is largely controlled at the local level, often the statutory authority
for local regulation will be grounded in state law. In general, cities, counties, and other
local government subdivisions are creatures of the state, thus states can and do legislate in
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over the local zoning function provides the opportunity to encourage or
direct parties to consider mediation in these cases. This can easily
overcome the resistance of local officials who are unfamiliar with or wary
of employing a new dispute resolution strategy. And, in general, state
governments are in a much better position to secure the resources necessary
to support a mediation effort, either directly or by providing grants to local
government or non-profit community mediation centers for this purpose.
Another reason for state-level coordination is the relative lack of
trained mediators. Multi-party disputes are a specialty in the dispute
resolution field, and relatively few mediators have the appropriate training
and experience to serve as neutrals in such disputes. Experience with land
use, and a demonstrated familiarity with or sensitivity to the concerns of
religious groups or individuals, may also be desirable qualities, and further
limit the pool of available mediators. Some communities do have active
community mediation programs, and it is possible that candidates will be
found close to home. As the use of mediation and other dispute resolution
increases over time, it may be possible for local government agencies to
develop in-house expertise, and to create along with other local agencies a
shared pool of mediators, allowing one agency to “lend” the services of an
in-house mediator to another agency when disputes arise.125 At a minimum,
a statewide clearinghouse function to aid communities in identifying
potential mediators would itself be highly useful.
Many states already have a state-level office of dispute resolution,
which provide a natural locus for coordinating funding, administration, and
perhaps even oversight of local mediation efforts. These offices could act
as resources to advise parties about dispute resolution options, and could
train, provide, or recommend mediators. A state-level office could also
review state law and even local regulations to identify any barriers to the
use of mediation, and recommend changes to those laws.126 It might also be
very helpful for legislators and other public officials, and the public itself,
to have good data about religious land use disputes. A state-level office of
dispute resolution could provide tracking, analysis, and reporting functions
both procedural and substantive areas of land use regulation.
125
I thank John Lande for suggesting this possibility, and for pointing out that a similar
system of shared neutrals already exists among federal agencies.
126
The tremendous variability of land use regulatory regimes makes any specific
recommendations for legislative or regulatory change impractical in the context of this
article. It will be important, in the context of a particular dispute, to examine applicable
laws and regulations, and identify what impediments they may pose for the use of
mediation. For example, authorizing legislation of some sort may be required to authorize
deviation from established procedures and to permit the use of mediation in some states, or
in some local jurisdictions. City attorneys and other local government counsel are likely to
be in the best position to undertake such an analysis.
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with respect to these disputes, functions that are commonly found at the
state level. In summary, whether employing prescriptive regulations or
incentives, any programmatic effort to encourage mediation in religious
land use disputes is more likely to be effective if implemented on a
statewide basis, since only the largest cities or metropolitan areas would be
able to sustain their own programs.
In the end, however, it will not be enough to simply provide the
process for resolving these disputes. Mediation’s value is instrumental, and
there must be persons of good will on all sides of a dispute who bring open
minds and open hearts to the task of engaging in a dialogue about their
differences. Happily, such qualities are a prominent concern in the ethical
teachings of all major religious traditions as well as other philosophical
traditions. They might be referred to collectively as the “ethic of
reciprocity.”127
In the Christian gospels, Jesus is questioned on the matter of living a
holy life:
[A]nd one of them, a lawyer, asked him a question to test
him. “Teacher, which commandment in the law is the
greatest?” [Jesus] said to him, ”’You shall love the Lord
your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and
with all your mind.’
This is the greatest and first
commandment. And a second is like it: ‘You shall love
your neighbor as yourself.’ On these two commandments
hang all the law and all the prophets.”128
Through this exchange, the gospel narrative draws into dynamic tension two
separate injunctions from the Hebrew Scriptures.129 When read together in
this manner, they offer a spacious and adaptable standard for right conduct
in everyday life.130 From a dualistic perspective the twin commandments
127

For a quick survey of this “ethic of reciprocity” in other world religions and other
major philosophical systems, see the website of Ontario Consultants for Religious
Tolerance, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/reciproc.htm (last visited April 5, 2006).
128
Matthew 22:35-40 (New Revised Standard Version) (all subsequent citations are to
this version). See, also, Mark 12:38-41; Luke 10:25-37. Cf. Romans 13:8-10 (“Owe no
one anything, except to love one another; for the one who loves another has fulfilled the
law. The commandments, ‘You shall not murder; You shall not steal; You shall not covet’;
and any other commandment, are summed up in this word, ‘Love your neighbor as
yourself.’ Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law.”);
Galatians 5:14 (same); James 2:8 (same).
129
Deuteronomy 6:5 (“You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with
all your soul, and with all your might.”), and Leviticus 19:18 (“you shall love your
neighbor as yourself”).
130
This passage, through its radical reductionism, might be seen as a rebuke to a
tradition of legalistic interpretations of scripture. However, there was already by this time
a tradition of scholarship associated with the Talmudic sage Rabbi Hillel that had produced
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might seem paradoxical, but from a third eminently practical perspective,
the resulting tension forms a crucible for living a moral life in the context of
a diverse community.
Arguably, the burden of this declaration is that all life is lived in the
context of relationship—relationship with one’s own existential or religious
commitments, but also relationship with the human and nonhuman world
with which we are inextricably interconnected. Philosopher and theologian
Martin Buber explored similar territory in his philosophy of dialogue,
famously declaring that, “All real living is meeting.”131 Mediation, as
conceived in this article, provides a form and forum for the gathering of
persons who are in conflict with one another. It offers the parties to a
religious land use dispute an opportunity to “come to the table,” to engage
in dialogue, and to seek resolution—even, perhaps, reconciliation—in the
very space that divides them: the place of meeting.132 That space between
disputants is the location of what conflict resolution experts call the Third
an identical formulation: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor; that is the
whole Torah, the rest is commentary; go and learn it.” See Talmud, Shabbat 31a (quoted in
THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE 43 New Testament (3rd ed. 2001). A similar
reductionism characterizes classical Zen koan literature. In one koan, for example, a monk
asks a Zen master to summarize everything the Buddha taught during the course of his 45year teaching career. The master replied, simply, “An appropriate statement.” THE BLUE
CLIFF RECORD 94 (Thomas Cleary & J.C. Cleary trans., 1992). This deft stroke, too, was
intended perhaps as a rebuke by the partisans of Zen, whose nascent Buddhism was deeply
intertwined with native Taoist beliefs, to distance themselves from the heavily
intellectualized and systematic tradition of Indian Buddhist thought that accompanied
Buddhism’s arrival in China. Like the Golden Rule, this classic Zen formulation offers a
simple yet profound ethic, unburdened by centuries of tradition and scholarship, but
capable of providing guidance for one’s actions in every circumstance.
131
MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU 11 (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., Charles Scribner’s
Sons 2d ed. 1958), quoted in Ackerman, supra note 7, at 28. Mediator Gary Gill-Austern
describes Buber’s conception of dialogue this way:
Buber tells us that human beings have a twofold attitude to the
world. The individual, the “I,” exists in relationships characterized as I-It
and I-Thou. The I-It describes our relations with nature and people in the
everyday; it is where we dwell most of the time. In the I-It, the I sees the
subjects of its perception as “other” and available for its utilitarian needs.
In this relationship, the “I” is primary, if not “all.” In contrast, the IThou describes a relation of mutuality, where neither I is primary. In
some sense, therefore, the I in the I-Thou is different from the I in the IIt. In the I-Thou, each I enters the “between” to meet the other, the Thou.
The place of meeting—the between—is where the I and the Thou engage
in dialogue.
Gary L. Gill-Austern, Faithful, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 343, 351-52 (2000)
(footnotes omitted).
132
See Gill-Austern, supra note 131, at 352. Buber’s use of the term “meeting” was
not limited to actual dialogues between people, but his broader metaphorical sense of the
term certainly included the more literal case, as suggested here.
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Story, 133 or the Mediative Perspective:134 the outlook of a disinterested and
neutral third party—such as a mediator—who is not being asked to decide
the dispute, has no stake in the outcome, is unconcerned with assigning
moral responsibility or blame, but is simply interested in helping the parties
resolve the dispute themselves.
Again, it is not enough to simply offer this space. Success in
mediation will require an effort by the parties to simultaneously consider
their own interests along side the interests of their neighbors and their
community. It will require a stance towards the dispute that acknowledges
the importance of the underlying civic relationship, and the intertwining of
one’s own interests with the interests of others.135 For the religious-minded,
such disputes may even function as a crucible for one’s religious practice,
providing the opportunity to cultivate wisdom and compassion. For others
perhaps more community-minded than religious, an equivalent opportunity
for moral growth and understanding would be presented.
A resolution achieved through mediation no more guarantees that
the “right” or “correct” result will be reached any more than does a court or
jury trial. Rather, a community’s choice to mediate a religious land use
dispute elevates certain process values—the democratic ideals of dialogue
and deliberation, along with community building—in the effort to resolve
the dispute. This effort through mediation to consciously engage the
tension of competing interests, done in the spirit of civic virtue, offers a
clear alternative to both administrative land use adjudication and to
litigation. Mediation, in this view, offers a free and diverse people the
133

See STONE, ET. AL., supra note 88, at 149-155 (“In addition to your story and the
other person’s story, every difficult conversation includes an invisible Third Story. The
Third Story is the one a keen observer would tell, someone with no stake in your particular
problem.”)
134
See GARY J. FRIEDMAN ET AL., SAVING THE LAST DANCE: MEDIATION THROUGH
UNDERSTANDING (videotape, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and The
Center for Mediation in Law).
135
The effort to find an appropriate resolution in the face of competing interests is also
very much at the heart of our system of justice. Benjamin Cardozo described justice as:
a concept far more subtle and indefinite than any that is yielded by
mere obedience to a rule. It remains to some extent, when all is said and
done, the synonym of an aspiration, a mood of exaltation, a yearning for
what is fine or high...Perhaps we shall even find at times that when
talking about justice, the quality we have in mind is charity.…
FRED R. SHAPIRO, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 231
(Oxford University Press 1993). Justice Cardozo, in this evocation of the Golden Rule,
meant to describe a transcendent value. But the underlying premise—that predetermined
rules, attitudes and responses may not always be of great value, or may even be harmful, in
the context of a particular dispute—contains the seeds of an eminently practical view of
dispute resolution. Indeed, a responsive ad hoc approach to conflict is virtually
synonymous, for some, with the techniques and strategies associated with mediation.
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opportunity to overcome the differences that sometimes painfully divide
them, and work to determine their own destiny—together.

